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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of unions on both the magnitude and
distribution of pension benefits. Our empirical results show that beneficiaries
in collectively bargained plans receive larger benefits when they retire,
receive larger increases in their benefits after they retire, and retire at
an earlier age than beneficiaries in other pension plans. As a result, the
pension wealth of union beneficiaries is 50 to 109 percent greater than that of
nonunion beneficiaries.
Just as wage differentials within and across establishments are smaller
among union workers, benefit differentials within and across cohorts of retirees
are smaller among union beneficiaries. This results from the smaller weight
given to salary average in determining initial benefits and the larger percentage
increases given to those who have been retired the longest under post-retirement
increases. The more compressed benefit structure under unionism causes the
union-nonunion compensation (wages plus pension contributions) differential to
decline more quickly than the union-nonunion wage differential over the life cycle.
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Studies of the rationale for pensions and analyses of theireconomic
effects have been one of the growth sectors in the field of laboreconomics
over the last five years. Reasons for this surge of interestare fairly
obvious--pensions are now a major component of emnloyer expenditures for
compensation and have important effects on work effort and labor mobility.
Much of the initial impetus toward the growth of pensionplans in the 1940s
and 1950s came from organized labor. Although pension olans have alsobecome
increasingly widespread in the nonunion sector, union membershiD remainsone
of the dominant factors in determining pensioncoverage. Accordinq to Kotlikoff
and Smith (1983), 76 percent of private waqe and salary workersbelonqing to
unions or employee associations are covered by pension planscompared to only
35 percent of nonunion workers.
This paper examines the effect of unions on both the maqnitude and dis-
tribution of pension benefits. Previous studies have dealt with the former
in two different ways. First, Freeman (1983) has estimated the difference
in employer contributions to pension plans between union and nonunionestablish-
ments over two different periods. Across all establishments, Freeman found
contributions were four cents per payroll hour hiqher between 1967 and 1972
and eight cents higher between 1973 and 1977 when 50 oercentor more of the
employees were covered by a collective bargaining aqreement. Almost all of the
difference can be attributed to the greater likelihood of union emoloyees
participating in a pension plan. Among only those establishments making contri-
butions to pension plans, contributions were estimated to be onl.y 0.3 centshigher
between 1967 and 1972 and 0.2 cents higher between 1973 and 1977 in unionized
establishments. Neither of these latter two noint estimates was larqer than its
standard error.2
On the surface, Freeman's results suggest there should be little difference
in pension benefits between union and nonunion beneficiaries. Such a conclusion
depends, however, on whether there are any differences in (1) hours worked and
the probability of receiving pension benefits between union and nonunion workers
and (2) rates of return and funding ratios between plans administered for union
and nonunion establishments. Since there are good reasons to doubt there are no
union—nonunion differences in these factors, the effect of unions on pension
benefits actually received cannot be deduced from the finding of no difference
in hourly contribution rates. This is not to suqqest differences in employer
contributions are not an important issue; for analyses of labor demand and the
effect of unions on cost and profitability, it is the issue. But to understand
the sorting of workers between union and nonunion jobs and the role of unions as
"voice' institutions., a second approach is required--examination of actual
benefit data.
Leigh (1981) attempted to do this by analyzing responses in the National
Longitudinal Survey for older men to the question "How much income per month
will you get from your pension plan?'Leigh's OLS results showed that, among
workers expecting to receive benefits, the expected pension benefit for union
workers is $72 per month lower than that of nonunion workers .Correctinnfor
selectivity bias in provision of pension plans, he found that expected monthly
benefits are $52 lower for union workers .Interpretationof these results
hinges on whether expectations of pension benefits are equally accuratefor
union and nonunion workers.' The "voice" model predicts union workers will have
more accurate expectations which is consistent with Leigh's findincis of (1) a laroer
oronortion of nonunion workers who said they did not know how much their pension benefits
would be and (2) a larger coefficient of variation of expected monthly pension
income for nonunion workers who thought they knew the magnitude of theirbenefits.
Although this does not necessarily imply that nonunion workerseither over—
or under-estimate their benefits ,dataon actual benefits clearly are free3
of any such bias.In addition, Leigh did not take into account possible
increases in benefits after retirement. As we have shown elsewhere (Allen,
Clark, and Sumner, 1984b), these increases are much larger in plans coveredby
collective bargaining agreements.
The issue of how unions affect the distribution of benefitsamonq retirees has
not been addressed in previous studies. One of the 'stylized facts" about the
effect of unions on wages is that they reduce wage differentials within and
across establishments. This paper examines whether they have a similar compressing
effect on the distribution of pension benefits.
This question has important implications for our understanding of the
union-nonunion compensation differential over the life cycle. Unionwage policies
raise the intercept and flatten the slope of wage functions, which implies that
the compensation differential falls with experience. Freeman has shown how the
greater pension coverage of union workers works in the opposite direction by
causing the compensation differential to widen with experience, aconsequence of
the greater rate of accrual of benefits in the later staqes of the life cycle.
A complicating factor ignored by Freeman but addressed here is whether,among
those eligible for benefits, the increment in pension wealth from an additional
year of experience varies by union status.
This issue also has direct implications for retirement incentives. If
the growth of pension wealth with experience is, say, smaller in union plans,
union workers wifl have a smaller incentive to continue working. The
effect of unionism on retirement aqe also depends on the union-nonunion differential
in the stock of pension wealth.
The ways in which unionism is likely to affect pension benefits are
examined in the next section. After briefly describing the data set, we report
our main empirical results. They show beneficiaries in collectively bargained
plans receive larger initial benefits, retire earlier, and get larger4
post-retirement increases in benefits. The regression results also pointout
important differences in the determinants of initial benefitsand post-
retirement increases by union status. The paper concludes by calculatinq and
interpreting the effect of unions on pension wealth and examining the implications
of the results for life cycle compensation profiles.
IT. How Unions Affect Pension Benefits
The likely effect of unions on pension benefits is discussed in Freeman
(1981 and 1983) and Leigh (1981), so we will provide only a brief summaryof
their arguments. Since our data set is restricted to a sample ofbeneficiaries,
we focus on arguments dealing with the magnitudeof benefits rather than on
those that focus only on the question of which firms have pension plans.The
standard monopoly model predicts both higher pensions and higher wagesunder
unionism, but makes no prediction about how the share of pensionsin total
compensation differs between union and nonunion plans.Freeman (1981)
argues the share of all fringe benefitswill be higher under collective bargaining
because preferences of older workers receive qreater weightand older workers
have greater demand for benefits. Older workers are especiallylikely to
have greater demand for pensions. Also, when there is a divergencebetween what
workers want and what management thinks they want with respectto the magnitude
of Dension benefits, this information will flow more rapidlyto management
under collective bargaining because of the voice' aspectsof union behavior.
The market "exit" mechanism in nonunion settings willbe less effective because
the younger and more mobile marginal worker will putmuch less weight on
pensions than will the older, inframarginalworker. Thus, because of greater
demand for pensions and the mechanisms for revealinginformation under unionism,
we expect retirees from collectively bargained plansto receive larger
benefits.5
Another consequence of this model is that the sortinq ofworkers with
heterogeneous tastes between union and nonunion establishments results in
the marginal union worker having a higher suprly price of frincies'.Young
workers who have little use for pensions will avoid jobs in the unionsector
because they know their preferences will be dominatedby those of older workers.
If the marginal worker exDects longer tenure in a unionsetting, this will, by
increasing the likelihood he will receive a pension, make him evenmore willing
to sacrifice wages in return for future benefits before he is vested.Finally,
the abflity of unions to monitor the firm and the pension fund isan additional
factor leading to higher benefits under unionism. Thecomplexity of benefit
formulas and pension plan provisions for such factors as participation,
vesting, and portability makes it very difficult for workers to evaluate
their plan or compare it to plans at other establishments. Unions hireexperts
to examine pension plan provisions and pension fund performance, giving
workers both more information about their plan and, in all likelihood ifexpert
opinion is translated into bargaining objectives, a more desirable plan.If
this additional information results in greater worker confidence in theDlan,
it will increase demand for pension benefits.
The effect of unionism on pension wealth cannot be estimatedaccurately
in a simple cross section benefit equation for two reasons.First, union
participants are more likely to be eligible for early retirement and disability
benefits. Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) report 86 percent of theparticipants of
union plans are covered by early retirement orovisions and 79percent are covered
by disability provisions. The corresponding figures for nonunion plans are 79
and 70 percent. Of course, greater eligibility for early retirement need not
translate into an earlier average retirement age, depending on how the benefit6
formula is adjusted for early retirees. Nonetheless, we expect earlier retirement
in union plans because if union participants receive larger benefits, the
resulting wealth effect leads them to spend part of those benefits on more
leisure.2 If union participants retire at an earlier age, the union coefficient
in the benefit equation underestimates the true impact of unionism on benefits.
To adjust for this, we estimate the impact of union status on age of retirement
in a separate equation. (There also may be longevity differences between union
and nonunion beneficiaries, but we have no information on the direction of this
potential source ofbias.)3
The second complicating factor is post-retirement increases in benefits.
Such increases can be provided only if participants accept lower wages orlower
initial benefits or if they result in more efficient separation decisions.In
practice, there is usually no formal pension plan orovisionfor post-retirement
increases, leaving the nonunion firm a tremendous incentive to renege on any
imolicit contract to provide such increases. This also makes such implicit
contracts less likely among nonunionplans.4
Potentially, unions can act as enforcement agents to prevent cheating by
the plan and increase the likelihood of post-retirement adjustments.Even
though such adjustments are not a mandatory bargaining topic,unions have ample
means to pressure employers to discuss the matter.Whether this is in the
union's interest is an empirical question. Many workers have the sameincentive
as the firm to violate arrangements made with retirees because they can use
the strike threat to obtain a share of the capital gains. On the other hand,
other workers will not want to forfeit the option of using' post-retirement7
adjustments as a risk-sharing device when they retire, especially if they already
have accepted lower wages in expectation of receiving future benefit increases.
This is especially likely to be true for older workers. The median voter
model predicts and Freeman's (1983) findings on pension plan provisions imply
that preferences of older workers receive much more weight in forminq union
objectives. This makes it more likely that unions will act in their interest.
Another factor encouraging unions to act in this fashion is the activity
of retirees in union political affairs. In some unions retirees can vote for
officers and attend conventions.In the United Mine Workers they even vote on
contract ratification. This means distributinn to retirees a portion of any
rents obtained in negotiations can yield a political payoff to union officers.
In contrast, retiree preferences receive zero weight in a nonunion setting,
making an intergenerational transfer from workers to retirees unlikely.
We have shown elsewhere (Allen, Clark, and Sumner, l984b) that union
beneficiaries are much more likely to receive post-retirement increases,
controlling for other factors such as olan size, salary average, initial
benefits, and years of service. At the sample means, the average union
participant received a 33 percent increase between 1973 and 1979; the average
nonunion participant, a 17 percent increase. Empirically, this calls for a
distinction to be made between initial benefits and the rate of chanoe in
benefits after retirement to get an accurate reading on the impact of unionism.
In addition to changing the size of the pension package, unions also are
likely to change the manner in which benefits are allocated. Many studies
have shown that unions compress occunational and life cycle wage differentials.
One reason frequently offered for this practice is tha,t it promotes solidarity
among union members. A wide dispersion can lead to the creation of dissident8
groups at either tail or in the middle of the wagedistribution. By collapsing
the distribution toward the middle, the odds of beinq able to achieve further
redistribution for any particular group become quite small. To examine whether
this argument has equal validity When applied to the distribution of pension
benefits, we will estimate separate initial benefit and post-retirementincrease
equations for union and nonunion beneficiaries.
III. Data Description
This analysis uses data from the Pension Benefit Master File (PBMF),
made available to the authors through a contract with the Department of Labor.
This is a survey based on a stratified random sample of oension plans filinq
series 5500 and 5500C forms in 1975. The PBMF contained firm-reportedinformation
on individuals receiving benefits in December 1978. Plan sponsors wereasked to
indicate the size and method of all post-retirement increases in benefits
between 1973 and 1978. Using this information we were able to construct a
benefit series that indicated the annual pension benefits from 1973 to1979 for
all persons retired prior to 1973. In addition, we were able todetermine the
benefit at retirement for persons retiring between 1973 and 1978 and any post-
retirement increases for these more recent retirees between their yearof
retirement and 1979.
Although the PBMF included defined contribution plans aswell as defined
benefit plans, this analysis concentrates exclusively on thedefined benefit
plans. The defined contribution plans were excludedbecause of limitations in
the survey that make it impossible to determine benefit increasesbetween 1973
or the year of retirement and 1979. As a result, wecould not calculate
initial benefits or post-retirement adjustments for individualscovered by the
defined contribution plans. Weights provided by the Departmentof Labor
enabled us to construct weighted samples of individuals and plansrepresentative9
of the set of defined benefit plans that existed in 1975. For a more detailed
description of this sample and our data construction techniques, see Clark,
Allen, and Sumner (1983) and Allen, Clark and Sumner (l984a, b).
Some plans did not report collective bargaining status on the PBMF. To
reduce the number of cases for which collective bargaining status was unknown,
we matched the PBMF with a file of the EBS-1 reports obtained from the National
Bureau of Economic Research. For the few cases in which these sources differed
on collective bargaining status, the data on the EBS—l reports were, on the advice
of the Department of Labor, assumed to be correct. Even with the addition of
the EBS-1 data, the collective bargaining status of some plans remained unspecified.
Rather than deleting these observations entirely, we use two union status variables
in the pooled samples. The first indicates whether the plan was collectively
bargained; the second, whether collective bargaining status was unreported.
This allows the coefficient of the first variable to be interpreted as a
union—nonunion difference. When separate equations are estimated on the basis
of union status, we do not examine the plans that have union status unreported.
Although the size of the samples used in the empirical work reported below
is quite larqe in terms of numbers of individuals (about 100,000), only
about 200 pension plans are represented. As a result, the precision of the union
coefficients will be overstated to some extent. The magnitude of this over-
statement cannot be determined, as most of the other variables in the model vary
across individuals rather than pension plans. Aqgregatinq the observations by
plan does not solve the problem because this eliminates most of the variation
between union status and the other independent variables, thus biasing the
union coefficient. Even though our approach is not completely satisfactory, keep
in mind that the precision of union coefficients in wage equations is overstated
in exactly the same way. A relatively small number of union contracts and
large nonunion companies will account for a disprooortionate share of the
observations in most data files commonly used by labor economists today.10
The PBMF contains data sufficient to examine the relationship among
different types of compensation that include salary average, initial pension
benefits, and post-retirement adjustments. This paper focuses on the effect of
unions on each of these forms of compensation. First, we examine a sample of
persons who retired between 1973 and 1977. Using this sample, we examine the
effect of unions on benefit levels and union-nonunion differences in factors
that determine benefit levels at retirement. Post-retirement adjustments are
also estimated for these retirees. Second, we examine a sample of persons who
retired between 1950 and 1972 for differences in post-retirement adjustments
attributable to union status.
IV. Empirical Results
In this section, we report the findings from a statistical analysis of
union effects on pension benefits. The results indicate that union retirees
receive higher initial benefits and greater post-retirement adjustments than
nonunion retirees.
Initial Benefits, 1973-77 Retirees.
Benefits at retirement are determined by plan formulas that generally are
of three types: (1) a flat dollar amount for all eligible beneficiaries,
(2) a flat dollar amount times years of service, or (3) a percentage of final
salary average times years of service. Kotlikoff and Smith report the largest
(47 oercent) proportion of participants in collectively bargained plans have
their benefits determined by the second type of formula, with 12 and 21 Dercent
covered by the first and third types of formulas.In nonunion plans 71 percent
have their benefits determined by the third type of formula, with 0.2 and
20 nercent covered by the first and second types of formulas. Because the
formulas are so different between union and nonunion plans, it is impossible to
determine the impact of unions on benefits simply by comparinq the formulas.
Also, formula comparisons require arbitrary assumptions about union-nonunion11
differences in years of service, earnings, and age of retirement. Accordingly,
we estimate initial benefit equations as a function of years of service, age at
retirement, and average earnings over the last five years of service.5 In
addition to these formula variables, we include in our specification dichotomous
variables for race, sex, year of retirement, industry, and union status. A
plan size variable that represents the number of beneficiaries in 1979 also is
included in the specification to control for positive correlation between size
and union status. After experimenting with a number of functional forms, we
decided to specify both initial benefits and salary average in logarithmic form.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show results of the initial benefit equations
when the logarithm of average salary during the last five years of work is excluded
(column 1) and included (column 2). Initial benefits clearly are influenced
by earnings. First, there is the direct positive relationship noted above in
which benefits are calculated as a percentage of final earnings. Second, there
is a positive relationship that stems from high-wage workers desiring larger
pensions because the after-tax price in the form of wage reductions will be lower.
Also, there is the simple positive correlation that results if fringe benefits
have a positive income or total compensation elasticity. Finally, there is an
inverse relationship stemming from a compensating differential, i.e., higher
pension benefits are paid for by lower wages. These simultaneous relationships
are not directly addressed by our empirical model.6
When the log of average earnings is included as an independent variable, the
estimated coefficients indicate that a 10 percent increase in averacie final
earnings raises initial benefits by approximately 3 percent. As for the
other coefficients, a 10,000-person increase in the number of 1979 beneficiaries
is associated with a 6 percent rise in initial benefits. An extra year of
service adds 5 percent to the benefit level. A somewhat puzzling result is the12
finding that delaying retirement by one year reduces benefits by 1 percent.
This may be attributable to the fact that more generous pension plans usually
allow earlier retirement.
The key result in Table 1 is that initial benefits are larger for union
beneficiaries.7 Without controlling for earnings in column 1, we find that
union beneficiaries receive 4 percent larger initial benefits. The difference
widens to 6 percent when the earnings average variable is added to the model in
column 2. The coefficients imply that a white male beneficiary previously
employed in manufacturing who retired in 1977 with the sample mean values of
earnings average, plan size, age at retirement, and years of service would
receive an initial benefit of $2411 from a nonunion plan and $2568 from a
union plan.
There are two puzzling aspects about these results. First, why is the
effect of unions on pension benefits so much smaller than almost all estimates
of their effect on wages? Second, why doesn't the union—nonunion difference in
benefits shrink in column 2 when earnings are added to the model? Assuminq
positive correlations between (1) unionism and wages and (2) wages and benefits,
the union coefficient in column 1 should have been larger than that in column 2.
These apparently contradictory results could be attributed to the sample selection
rule from which they are generated. This is a sample of workers who received
pensions from defined benefit plans; workers who were not covered by Dension plans,
rkers covered by defined contribution plans, and workers who were covered by
defined benefit plans but did not qualify for benefits are omitted.
To get a better feeling for how to interpret our results, we estimated an
earnings average equation. The results in column 3 of Table 1 show beneficiaries
in collectively bargained plans had a 7 percent lower earnings average in their
last five years of employment. At first glance, this seems to contradict years











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































account for this apparent contradiction. First, the sample selection criteria
exclude many low—wage nonunion workers. Second, the PBMF does not contain any
human capital variables except years of service. Thus, we are unable to
account for differences in earnings due to education or occupational differences.
The sample selection criteria and lack of human capital measures suggest that
we are comparing blue collar union workers with white collar nonunionworkers
who have more years of schooling. These factors are less important in the
benefit equations because of the inclusion of earnings as an independent variable.
The union-nonunion wage differential also may be understated because of using
only the last five years of earnings to derive the earnings averagevariable.
Other studies have shown that the wage differential narrows with age, so we are
estimating the union effect at a point in the life cycle at which it is expected
to be relatively small.
An extra year of service raises final earnings by 0.9 percent, indicating
that earnings rise until retirement in this sample. Consistent withthis
response is the finding that later retirementincreases final earnings.
Delaying retirement by one year increases final earnings by0.4 percent.
Increases in plan size raise final earnings. This conforms to expectationsif
plan size is a proxy for the size of the firm. The pointestimate indicates
that an additional 10,000 beneficiaries increases final earnings by 1.5 oercent.
To estimate the effect of unions on pension wealth, we must alsodetermine
whether unionism has any effect on age of retirement. To get a roughestimate
of this effect, we regressed age at retirement on union status, earnings average,
initial benefits (a proxy for pension wealth), and the other independent
variables used in the benefit and earnings average equation. Wefind that
union beneficiaries retire almost one year earlier thannonunion beneficiaries.
At the sample means of all independent variables, the averageunion beneficiary
retires at age 61.9; the nonunion beneficiary, at age 62.7.15
Although our model in column 4 is much less econometrically elaborate
than most retirement models, results for the earningsaverage and pension
benefit coefficients are comparable to previous results. We findpersons with
higher earnings in their last years of work and smaller initial benefits more
likely to work longer. However, the magnitude of both coefficients is rather
small. A one-unit increase in log earnings average (equivalent to thousands of
dollars) is associated with only a 0.4-year delay in retirement; a one-unit
decrease in log initial benefits corresponds to a 0.3-year delay.
Differences in benefit formulas used in collectively bargained planssuggest
that determinants of pension benefits vary greatly by union status. Table 2
reports the results of benefit at retirement equations when the sample is sorted
by union status. Recalling differences in the benefit formulas, we expect
that increases in. earnings will have a larger effect in nonunion Dlans. This
prediction is confirmed by the results shown in Table 2. In addition, the
plan size effect is twice as large for the nonunion sample. The only qualitative
difference between the two equations concerns the age of retirement variable.
Nonunion plans have the expected relationship of higher benefits for delayed
retirement, whereas members of union plans have lower benefits with delayed
retirement.
A final relationship is shown below when type of retirement (normal,early,
postponed or disability) variables are included in the regression equations. This
does not produce any major changes in the other independent variables (including
age at retirement), so they are not repeated here. Union retirees who retire
early receive 10 percent more in benefits than those retiring at the normal age
whereas nonunion retirees receive 10 percent less. Union members taking a
disability retirement receive 6 percent more than those retiring at the normal age,
but nonunion disability retirees receive 18 percent less. Postponed retirement
for both groups leads to lower benefits.16















































Note: The dependent variable is in logarithmic form. Each equation also
contains an intercept and dummy variables indicating industry (6),
year of retirement (4), and whether sex is unreported.The same


















Until recently, it was widely believed that private pension benefitswere
fixed in nominal terms. Allen, Clark, and Sumner (1984a,b)present evidence that
this has not been true. Instead there were sizable increases in benefitsafter
retirement during the mid—l970s. Column 1 of Table 3 reproducesa post-
retirement adjustment equation (Allen, Clark, and Sumner (1984b)) forpersons
retiring between 1950 and 1972. The second column shows the results from a
similar equation for persons retiring between 1973 and 1977. Because thereare
fewer years for potential increases for the second sample, and because increases
tend to be larger in percentage terms for those retired the longest, weexpect
the coefficients to be smaller for this sample of more recent retirees.
The union coefficient indicates that the 1950-72 retirees in collectively
bargained plans received increases which were 16.9 percentage points larger than
their nonunion counterparts. For the 1973-77 retirees, the union differential is
only 5 percentage points. A large plan size effect is found for both samples,
with a 10,000 beneficiary increase resulting in a 4 percentage point increase
for the older retirees and a 1 percentage point increase for the more recent
retirees.For the older sample, additional years of service increase18


















































Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of the change in benefits between
1973 and 1979 to 1973 benefit for 1950-72 retirees; the ratio of the
change of benefits between the year of retirement and 1979 to benefits
at retirement for 1973-77 retirees. Each equation also contains
intercept and dummy variables indicating industry (6) ,yearof retire-
ment (22 in column 1, 4 in column 2). whether union status is unreported,
and whether ex is unreported. The same weighting procedure is used here
as tn Table 1.19
post-retirement adJustments whereas for those that retire atyounger aqes,
larger increases are provided. The relationships for years of service andage
at retirement did not hold for the more recent retirees.
How were benefit increases distributed to retirees by union and nonunion
plans? The frequency distribution of benefit increase formulas is reported in
Table 4. A few plans did not use the same type of benefit increase formula
each time they gave an increase. For instance, a firmmay have given the
same percentage increase to all retirees in 1974, but larger percentage
increases to those retired the longest in 1977. As a result, the columns in
Table 4 are non-additive. There is only one entryper plan per type of benefit
increase formula in the table. A plan will be represented more thanonce
only if it uses more than one type of benefit increase formula.
Only 16.9 percent of the plans gave straight percentage increases.
Both union and nonunion plans tended to favor other approaches. Half the
nonunion plans increased benefits by a percentage, with the percentage increasing
with the amount of time the person had been retired. Most union plansgave
either the same dollar amount increase to all retirees orgave a fixed dollar
amount per year of service. The former method is parallel to compressed
occupational wage differentials in the union sector. The latter reflects the
political dominance of senior workers in union decision making. These two
approaches also produce larger percentage increases for those who have been
retired the longest, as long as their benefits are lower than those of more
recent retirees.
The net effect of union-nonunion differences in benefit increase formulas
can be gauged by estimating separate benefit increase equations by union
status over 1950-72 retirees receiving at least one increase between 1973
and 1979. These are reported in the appendix. The most interesting difference
between the union and nonunion benefit equations is the pattern of the year20



















Percent increase 13 8 5 16.9 17.8 15.6
Percent increase,
percentage increasing
with time retired 27 11 16 35.1 24.4 50.0
Percent increase,
percentage increasing
with CPI 6 2
.
4 7.8 4.4 12.5
Flat dollar increase 14 13 1 18.2 28.9 3.1
Flat dollar increase
per year of service 22 16 6 28.6 35.6 18.8
Flat dollar increase,
amount increasing
with time retired 3 2 1 3.9 4.4 3.1
Flat dollar increase
per year of service,
amount increasing with
time retired 3 2 1 3.9 44 3,1
Other 4 3 1 5.2 6.7 3.1
Total 77 5 32 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Some plans used more than one benefit increase technique over this
period, making the columns non-additive. Only plans with persons
retired before 1973 are included in the sample.21
of retirement dummies, presented in Figure 1.These dummies indicate that the
increases awarded to longer term retireesare relatively much greater for union
than for nonunion beneficiaries, a possibleresponse to union efforts to compress
the compensation and/or benefit distribution.Union beneficiaries retiring in
the 1950s received benefit increases 47percentaqe points larger than those
received by union beneficiaries retiring in 1972.This difference was only 18
percentage points for nonunion beneficiaries. A similarpattern holds for those
retiring in the 1960s, as union beneficiaries receivedincreases 27 percentage
points larger than those of 1972 retirees, whereasnonunion beneficiaries who
retired in the l960s received benefit increasesonly 9 percentage points
larger. In contrast, 1970 and 1971 retirees in both unionand nonunion plans
received increases only slightly larger than those of1972 retirees. The smoother
time pattern of increases in benefits seems attributableto a larqer and more
even distribution of beneficiaries across theyears of retirement in the union
sample.
V. Unions and Pension Wealth
Empirical results in the last section show union beneficiariesretire
earlier and receive both larger initial benefits andpost-retirement increases
in benefits. To compare pension wealth for union andnonunion retirees, two
sets of calculations were performed. In the firstset, we used mean values from
the union (nonunion) sample of years of service andsalary average to calculate
initial pension benefits for union (nonunion) workers.To isolate the effect
of unionism on pension benefit formulas, we performeda second set of calculations
using the mean values of years of service and salaryaverage for the entire
sample to obtain initial benefits for both union and nonunion beneficiaries.
In both sets of calculations, the initial benefits for union(nonunion) bene-
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Coefficients of year of retirement dummies in post-retirement
increase equations: ee74 line, union beneficiariesdos2ed line,
nonunionbeneficiaries23
union (nonunion) sample. We assume union beneficiaries live for 18 years after
retirement in converting this initial benefit estimate into a pension wealth
estimate. When retirement ages of union and nonunion beneficiaries are held
constant, this same assumption is used for nonunion beneficiaries. We use a
discount rate of 3 percent. For age of retirement we assume that either (1) it
is identical for union and nonunion beneficiaries or (2) it is .84 years later for
nonunion beneficiaries, reducing the time in which benefits are received by an
equal amount. The latter assumption is based on the age at retirement reqression
results in Table 1.
For post-retirement increases we examine four cases: (1) none are
given; (2) only union beneficiaries receive them; (3) all union and nonunion
beneficiaries receive them; and (4) increases are given by union and nonunion
plans with an adjustment for the greater proportion of union beneficiaries
receiving increases.8 The magnitudes of the post-retirement increases are derived
from the results in Appendix Table 1. For the first seven years after retire-
ment, we use the predicted value for a person retiring in 1972 (.249 for union
retirees; .190, nonunion). For the next five- and six-year periods, we use
the predicted values for persons retiring in 1967 and 1961,respectively
(.435 and .688 for union; .235 and .275, nonunion). The underlying assumption is
that both the magnitude of increases (in percentage terms) and the distribution
of increases across cohorts of retirees are constant over time. Based on
our examination of a sample of union contract histories reported in BLS Wage
Chronologies, this does not seem to be an unreasonable assumption for union
beneficiaries. Under these assumptions, benefits increase by 202.5 percent over
an 18-year period for union beneficiaries receiving increases; 87.4 percent
over 18 years for nonunion beneficiaries. This is equivalent to an annual
increase of 6.34 percent for union beneficiaries, 3.55 percent for nonunion
beneficiaries.
Let's turn now to the pension wealth comparisons in Table 5. The first
row examines the case in which there are no post-retirement adjustments.24
Pension wealth is 50 percent greater for union beneficiaries when we allow
years of service and salary history to vary by union status. If we set
years of service and salary history to be equal for union and nonunion bene-
ficiaries, the effect of unionism on pension wealth falls to 8 percent. The
latter figure is slightly larger than the amount implied by the union coefficient
in the initial benefit equations in Table 1 because it is derived from the
specification with complete union status interactions in Table 2.
The effect of unionism on pension wealth becomes much larger when we
take into account post-retirement adjustments. The most reliable comparisons of
pension wealth are reported in the last row of Table 5. Allowing for post-
retirement increases in benefits raises the effect of unionism from 50 to 98
percent, allowing for union-nonunion differences in years of service and salary
average; from 8 to 43 percent, controlling for these differences.Many
nonunion beneficiaries (42 percent) received no increases. When we compare
pension wealth for nonunion beneficiaries who do not receive post-retirement
increases with that of union beneficiaries who do, these gaps widen further to
162 percent allowing for union nonunion differences in years of service and
salary average; 89 percent, controlling for these differences.
Allowing for differences in retirement age results in a modest increase in
our estimates of the effect of unionism on pension wealth. The difference
increases by 6 to 17 percentage points when retirement for nonunion beneficiaries
is delayed by .84 years.
Considering all three effects simultaneously and adjusting for the greater
proportion of union beneficiaries receiving increases, pension wealth is 50 to
109 percent higher for beneficiaries in plans covered by collective bargaining.
This range is well above all reasonable estimates of the effect of unions on
wages, implying wage differences vastly understate the effect of unions on

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































These results are especially puzzling once we reconsider Freeman's (1983)
finding of no union-nonunion difference in employer contributions to pension
plans per hour among establishments making such contributions. If union
employers contribute no more than nonunion employers, where does the money to
finance larger benefits come from? There are four possibilities: (a) larqer
total contributions in union plans (in contrast to employer contributions per
hour), (b) the smaller percentage of employees receiving pensions in union plans;
(c) higher rates of return in union plans; and (d) lower funding ratios for union
plans.
a. Contributions. There is no evidence that union members work more hours than
nonunion workers. Although we know of no data about how the magnitude of employee
contributions varies by union status, Freeman has examined whether union or
nonunion plans are more likely to allow such contributions. Controlling for a
number of plan characteristics, he found union plans are 21 percent less likely to
involve voluntary employee contributions. The greater incidence of employee
contributions in nonunion plans implies larger benefits in nonunion plans.
b. Percentage receiving pensions. This depends upon turnover rates and vesting
requirements in union and nonunion establishemnts with pension plans. Mitchell
(1982) found much lower quit probabilities for union workers, even with controls
for pension coverage. Freeman (1980) indirectly controls for the effect of all
fringe benefits on tenure (which depends on layoff, discharge, and quit rates)
by using the omitted variable bias formula. Ignoring fringes, he finds tenure
is 1.06 years higher for union workers. The difference narrows to 0.79 years once
fringes are controlled for. This sugaests contributions per eventual beneficiary
are higher in nonunion plans because participants are less likely to stay long
enough to collect benefits. Offsetting this are the stricter vesting requirements
in union plans. However, almost all persons receiving benefits have much more
than the minimum years of service required for vesting. Kotlikoff and Smith
report 9.7 years are required for full vesting in union plans; 9.0 years, in27
nonunion plans. Both figures are well below the mean years of credited service in
our sample.
C. Rates of return. There has been a great deal of controversy for some time about
whether union plans earn the highest possible rates of return. One source of
concern has been corruption among trustees appointed by union officials in
Taft-Hartley plans, which are jointly administered by labor and management.
Cases in which pension fund assets have been invested in very speculative ventures
(frequently associated with organized crime) or used for personal gain by union
officials have been widely publicized.
More recently union officials have become interested in using pension funds
to advance a variety of social causes, including the organization of union workers.
By refusing to invest in certain comoanies because they do business in South Africa
or have violated labor laws, some union plans may be unable to out together the
most desirable portfolio of assets. Whether this is actually the case is
an empirical question. So far no one, to our knowledge, has produced any evidence
that such restrictions on possible portfolios result in lowerrates of return.
Some plans knowingly have invested in projects offering lower returns
to increase the utilization of their members, and possibly, add new members.
This practice generates additional contributions to the fund, but it also may
create additional future liabilities, depending on the benefit formula, rules
for vesting, and whether the project increases employment or hours of union
workers. The net effect of such practices on the amount of funds available in
future years thus is unclear.
Despite all of these possible sources of lower returns to collectively
bargained plans, available evidence indicates that returns to union and nonunion
plans are not very different. Munnell (1983) reDorts the results of a comparison
made by the A. G. Becker Co. of the median rate of return for Taft-Hartley plans
to all plans between 1973 and 1982. Over the entire period, a plan earning the
median rate of return of the Taft-Hartley plans would have grown by 69 percent,28
equivalent to an annual return of 5.4 percent. A plan earning the median rate for
all plans would have grown by 64 percent, equivalent to a 5.1 percent annual return.
Although Taft-Hartley plans fared better on average, the difference is very small
and seems to be primarily attributable to smaller holdings of equities in union
plan portfolios in 1973 and 1974, two especially disastrous years for the
stock market.
d. Funding ratios. If the larger pension wealth for union beneficiaries does
not come from greater contributions per eventual beneficiary or from a higher
rate of return, we are left with a final possibility--the funding status of
collectively bargained plans. Despite the tax advantage of full funding described
by Black (1980) and Tepper (1981), many plans are not fully funded.9 One reason
for this, Sharpe (1976) argues, is that fully funded plans lose the option
of allowing the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to assume the liability
for unfunded benefits not covered by 30 percent of the sponsor's net worth.
A recent study by Richard Ippolito (1983) of the U.S. Department of Labor
produces strong evidence that plans covered by collective bargaining agreements have
much lower funding ratios than nonunion plans. Using a smaple of 826 defined
benefit plans filing reports with the Department of Labor in 1978, Ippolito
found the funding level of union plans (with respect to vested labilities) 31
percentage points below that of nonunion plans. Based on Ippolitos estimate of
a 60 percent funding ratio in 1978, the results suggest, holding plan size,
industry, year created, and employment growth in industry constant, the average
nonunion plan is 78 percent funded, whereas the average union plan is only 47
percent funded.
There is good reason to doubt the accuracy of the absolute magnitudes of
these figures because they are based on an interest rate assumption of 2 percent.
At least among the large firms represented on the COMPUSTAT data files, most
plans are overfunded, especially when vested liabilities are evaluated at the same29
interest rate and that interest rate is at a reasonable level, currently about
6 or 7 percent (see Feldstein and .Morck, 1983).
Although we are not currently prepared either to explain or to estimate
the average funding ratios of union and nonunion plans, consider two possible
scenarios, both of which are consistent with Ippolito's regression results:
(1) union plans tend to be fully funded whereas nonunion plans are over funded and
(2) union plans are underfunded, whereas nonunion plans are fully funded. Under
the first scenario, the seeming contradiction between higher pension wealth for
union beneficiaries despite identical or lower contributions per eventual beneficiary
is easily resolved-—part of the nonunion contributions is being used to maintain
the overfunded status of the plan. In other words, nonunion plans are contributing
more than necessary to fund current and future benefits, presumably because of
the resulting tax advantages. Why aren't managers for collectively bargained plans
following the same strategy, especially those in which none of the trustees are
appointed by labor? The reason is that unions have the ability at regular intervals
to push contract negotiations for higher initial benefits and increases in
benefits for those already retired. The strike threat gives the union power to
convert an overfunded plan to a fully funded or underfunded one. (Unions cannot
bargain directly over funding ratios.) Knowing this, managers of collectively
bargained plans put no more money than necessary into the fund. According
to this scenario, then, unions are able to constrain the behavior of fund
managers so that all contributions eventually end up in the hands of beneficiaries
instead of the stockholders or management.
In the second scenario, union plans are underfunded and the burden of higher
benefits falls on younger workers. Identical contributions per hour can provide
larger benefits for union beneficiaries under this scenario as lonq as the
ratio of participants to beneficiaries is sufficiently high. Younger workers are
willing to participate in an unfunded plan as long as (1) they receive rents and30
(2) they expect another generation of workers to pay for their benefits when they
retire. Such an arrangement is not viable for nonunion plans. The nonunion firm
always has an incentive to terminate an underfunded plan. By doing so, it can
avoid paying the difference between vested and funded benefits. There is one
catch, however, pointed out by Bulow (1982) that keeps nonunion plans fully
funded--workers will not stay with a firm when the plan is not fully funded
unless the firm offers a compensating wage differential. A questionable aspect of
this scenario is whether the participant-beneficiary ratio has been or will
remain high enough to guarantee survival of the system. Ippolito accounts for
greater underfundirig in the union sector via an entirely different mechanism-—
employers intentionally underfund union plans to discourage the union from threatening
the firm's financial health, If union behavior causes the firm to qo out of
business, employees then lose a substantial proportion of their pensions.
However, the threat of job loss seems to be equally credible in this regard.
Further empirical work will be needed to establish which of these scenarios and
interpretations are consistent with the data.
VI. Unions and Age-Conpensation Profiles
Many studies have shown that tenure-earnings profiles for union workers
have higher intercepts and flatter slopes. Do pension accruals imply that the
total compensation profile also has this pattern? Freeman shows how the greater
coverage of union workers by pension plans and the largerincrements in pension
wealth in the last years of the life cycle in defined benefit plans widens the
wage difference among older workers. This partiallybut not totally reverses the
flattening of the profile. Here we go one step further and compare tenure-earnings
profiles and tenure-compensation profiles for union and nonunionworkers covered
by pension plans where compensation equals earnings plus pensioncontributions.31
We use earnings functions of the form
w(t) =w(0)(l+g)t,
where w(0) equals $10,000 for union workers and $8,000 for nonunion workers,
g equals .03 for union workers and .033 for nonunion workers, and t represents tenure
and is allowed to be as long as 30 or 40 years. The pension benefit formulas
are derived from the coefficients in Table 2 using the means for the pooled union
and nonunion sample of plan size, industry, year of retirement, race, sex, and
age at retirement. These formulas are:
log B =4.257+.0455t+.280log (E)
log BN =1.429+.0602t+.546log (c),
whereB =initialbenefit for union workers, BN =initialbenefit for nonunion
workers, and E= earningsaverage over the last five years. We assume workers
are fully vested in their tenth year and have zero vesting beforehand. Pension
wealth estimates are based upon 18 years of retirement and a 3 percent discount
rate. The pension contribution for each year equals the increase in pension wealth
minus the return (also 3 percent) on last period's pension wealth. The latter
figure must be subtracted because it would have accrued even if the participant did
not work.
Results for 40-year life cycles are reported in the first seven columns of
Table 6. By construction, the percentage difference in earnings between union
and nonunion workers falls from 25 percent in the first year to 12 percent in the
fortieth year. This pattern is similar to those of previous studies (summarized
in Lewis, Ch. 7). Pension contributions begin in the tenth year. The contribution
for union workers is 33 percent larger in that year because the union benefit
formula has a larger intercept. This figure is much larger than the union—
nonunion earnings diffential in the tenth year (22 percent). The total compen-
sation differential based on both earnings and pension contributions, is 26
percent. This is considerably larger than the total compensation differential



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In all following periods, larger contributions are required for nonunion
workers. This happens because increases in average earnings andyears of service
have larger effects on pension benefits for nonunion workers and becauseearnings
grow more rapidly for nonunion workers. Even though union workers have higher
earnings, the increment in pension wealth resulting from rising earnings over the
life cycle is rather small because of the compressed benefit structure. Asa
result, after the tenth year, the union-nonunion compensation differential is
smaller than the earnings differential. In the 35th year and thereafter,
total compensation is greater for nonunion workers. The figures for the 30-year
life cycle case in the last four columns tell basically the same story-—among those
receiving pension benefits, the pension benefit structure under unionism causes
the compensation differential to decline more quickly than the earnings differential
over the life cycle.
VII. Conclusion
The main finding of this paper is that pension wealth for beneficiaries
in plans covered by collective bargaining agreements is significantly larger
than pension wealth for other beneficiaries. Three factors contribute to this
union-nonunion pension wealth differential: higher initial benefits, larcier
post-retirement increases in benefits, and earlier receipt of benefits for those in
collectively bargained plans.
This finding is somewhat surprising, given the earlier results of Freeman and
Leigh on union-nonunion differences in the magnitude of pension contributions and
expected pension benefits. The key factor in reconciling Freeman's results with
ours seems to be the lower funding ratios in plans covered by collective bargaininq
agreements. Except in the case of Taft-Hartley multiemployer plans, unions
are unable to control directly a plan's financial management. Funding ratios and
investment decisions generally are not subject to collective bargaining; unions
can influence these decisions only indirectly through bargaining for changes in34
the benefit formula. The question of whether and why collective bargaining status
seems to have an important effect on plan financial decisions should be investigated
further.
The contrast between Leigh's findings on expected benefits and our results
on benefits actually received suggests that either union workers are more likely
to underestimate their benefits or nonunion workers are more likely to overestimate
theirs. The best way to determine which of these two explanations is correct would
be to compare questionnaire responses of employees to actual pension plan records.
Lacking this, some insight can still be obtained by comparing expected benefits in
1971 in Leigh's sample of men between the ages of 50 and 64 with. initial benefits
for our sample of persons retiring between 1973 and 1977. Controlling for
other factors, Leigh found the expected monthly benefit for union beneficiaries to
be $306; nonunion, $358. The initial benefit for a union retiree, based on the
results in column 2 of Table 1 is $2568; for a nonunion retiree with the same
characteristics, $2411. Converting Leigh's figures to annual amounts, we find
that both the mean union and nonunion expectations of benefits are well above the
respective means of benefits actually received, but the estimates of union
workers are closer to the mark. The degree of overestimation amounts to $1104
annually for the union workers, compared to the $1885 overestimate of annual
benefits for nonunion workers. This is consistent with the prediction of the
"voice" model that unions have important effects on the flow of information within
establishments.
The other important result in this paper is our finding that among employees
participating in a pension plan, the union-nonunion compensation differential
narrows more rapidly over the life cycle than the union-nonunion earninQs differ-
ential. This results from the more compressed pension benefit structure under
unionism. Benefits increase with earnings and tenure at a slower rate in collectively
bargained plans. This effect is accentuated by the slower growth of earnings
in the union sector.35
This finding, combined with Freeman's examination of earnings profiles, shows
that pension coverage is an important conditioning factor for understandinq how
the union-nonunion compensation differential changes over the life cycle.It would
be interesting to see whether the observed patterns of union-nonunion earnings
differentials are a function of pension coveraqe.
Implications of our results on the effect of retirement age on initial
benefits and the effect of union status on retirement age are less clear
because of unresolved biases. The tremendous difference in the retirement age
coefficients in the initial benefit equations for union and nonunion workers
does suggest that future attempts to model the pension contract or to explain
retirement decisions pay more attention to how incentives for separation and
retention of older employees vary by union status.36
Footnotes
1A complicating factor in this regard is the differencein benefit formulas
between union and nonunion plans. Most nonunion plans calculate benefits as a
percentage of the product of final earnings and year of service. These formulas
partially index benefits to earnings growth, reducing the likelihood of frequent
adjustments in the formula. This is not the case for union plans, where benefits
equal so many dollars per year of service. Thus, to predict benefits accurately,
nonunion employees need to predict future earnings, whereas union employees have
to predict future revisions of the benefit formula. This assumes, of course,
that both sets of employees know what type of formula is actually being used.
2The results reported below also show that the increment inpension wealth
resulting from working an additional year is smaller in union plans, qivinq initial
impetus to earlier retirement of union workers.
3One reason to believe that this bias is unimportant is that thereare no
pronounced union-nonunion differences in the distribution of year of retirement in
Appendix Table 1.
4The economic rationale for such contracts is explored in Allen,Clark,
and Sumner (l984b).
5The earningsaverage variable is derived from the individual's Social
Security earnings history. The Fox algorithm is used to estimate annual earninqs
for those with earnings not subject to the Social Security payroll tax.
6Two additional possible sources of bias are the endogeneity of pension
coveraqe and union status. Our data set does not include retirees not receiving
pension benefits or establishments that do not provide pensions, which prevents
us from attempting to correct for the former type of bias. As for the latter type
of bias, there is no concensus within the profession about how to deal with it.37
7Percent unionamong the beneficiaries of our sample is much larger than percent
union among workers. Three factors account for this. First,pension coverage is
qreater among union workers. Kotlikoff and Smith report from the May 1979
Current Population Survey that 76 percent of union workers are coveredversus only
35 percent of nonunion workers. Although percent unionamonq all workers is 24
oercent, percent union among those covered by pension plans is 40 oercent. A
separate breakdown by Kotlikoff and Smith of plan participant data from EBS-l
files shows 47 percent are in union plans. The second factor is thata higher
proportion of nonunion participants are in defined contribution plans. The EBS-l
files show 54 percent of the participants in defined benefit plansare in
union plans. The third factor is that the average union plan has been in existence
longer than the average nonunion plan. We cannot account for the magnitude of
the effect of this latter factor.
•
8Thjs adjustment is madeby using the result from Allen, Clark, and
Sumner (l984b) that union beneficiaries are 23 percent more likely to receive
post—retirement increases. With 75 percent of all beneficiaries receiving increases
and 73 percent of the beneficiaries being in collectively bargained plans, this
means that 81 percent of the union beneficiaries and 58 percent of the nonunion
beneficiaries receive benefit increases. These latter two figures are used to
obtain estimated pension wealth for union and nonunion beneficiaries, the
ratio of which is reported in the last row of Table 5.
9Full funding results in lowertaxation because assets in the pension fund
accumulate at a pre-tax rate, whereas assets held outside the fund accumulate at
an after-tax rate.38
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AppendixTable 1. Post—retirement increase equations, 1950—72
by union status
retirees receiving benefit increaseB,
Sample lkiion Nonunion
Coefficient Standard error MeanCoefficient Standard error
1979 recipients/105 .261 .193 .014 .048 .785 .054
Years of aervice/102 .258 .404 .037 .241 .195 .039
Age at retirement/102 .626 —.187 .072 .614 .046 .075
White .921 —.081 .011 .959 —.072 .016
Male .789 —.340 .008 .567 —.066 .006
Year of retirement
1950 .001 .392 .101 .001 .270 .078
1951 .001 .421 .080 .002 .244 .068
1952 .002 .660 .060 .002 .230 .068
1953 .003 .569 .057 .036 .035 .019
1954 .004 .495 .047 .003 .226 .053
1955 .006 .458 .040 .004 .215 .048
1956 .008 .539 .034 .004 .185 .048
1957 .011 .396 .030 .051 .057 .016
1958 .015 .386 .026 .010 .163 .030
1959 .021 .384 .022 .011 .186 .029
1960 .023 .356 .021 .016 .168 .024
1961 .026 .439 .020 .061 .085 .015
1962 .034 .389 .018 .025 .106 .020
1963 .037 .363 .018 .034 .103 .018
1964 .033 .276 .018 .034 .115 .018
1965 .065 .287 .014 .108 .052 .013
1966 .069 .222 .014 .054 .149 .015
1967 .070 .186 .014 .058 .041 .015
1968 .081 .106 .013 .063 .051 .014
1969 .099 .043 .012 .128 .053 .012
1970 .102 .031 .012 .087 .041 .013











the ratio of the increase in
restricted to those receiving
dummy variables indicating
benefits between 1973 and
benefit increases. Each
industry (6) and whether sex
1979 to 1973
equation also
is unreported.